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A CURRENT REVIEW OF CHINESE LAND-USE LAW AND
POLICY: A “BREAKTHROUGH” IN RURAL REFORM?
Robin Dean and Tobias Damm-Luhr†
Abstract: Three decades ago, China moved from a communal system of farming
to a system that granted more extensive land-use rights to individual households, starting
rural China on a path to greater prosperity. Today, however, the law and policy
promulgated by the Chinese government prevents farmers from fully realizing this
prosperity. The Land Administration Law gives farmers thirty-year contractual rights to
the land they farm and the Law on Rural Land Contracting strengthens this right by more
specifically enumerating requirements for land contracting and the transfer of contractual
rights. Nevertheless, the rural-urban gap is the worst it has been in decades and rural
Chinese are left behind to watch their urban counterparts enjoy China’s recent economic
success. Realizing the need for rural reform, the government has issued two policy
directives that outline measures to increase land tenure security with the goals of
doubling farmers’ incomes by 2020 and maintaining the country’s grain supply. While
these documents are well intentioned, they are insufficient to fully address rural issues
surrounding land tenure rights and do not represent a breakthrough in rural land reform.
In order for the policy directives to be more effective, the Chinese government should
define who exercises collective ownership rights over farmland, implement a rural
registration system, and educate farmers concerning that system. By taking these steps,
China will better ensure that conditions in its rural areas will begin to match the
prosperity that was envisioned for them thirty years ago.

“You will all have more money in your pockets in the future.”
Hu Jintao to the residents of Xiaogang village, September 20081

I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2008, the Chinese government celebrated the thirtieth anniversary
of the economic reforms that brought China prosperity and growth.2 These
reforms included the introduction of the Household Responsibility System
(“HRS”) to the Chinese countryside, which ended collectivized agriculture
and heralded a return to individual farming.3 China’s increased prosperity,
however, has been realized mainly in the country’s urban areas, where a

†

Juris Doctorates expected 2010, The University of Washington School of Law. The Authors would
like to thank the editors and staff of the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, Professor Dongsheng Zang for
his guidance, and RDI Staff Attorney Keliang Zhu for his insight.
1
Wieland Wagner, China’s Rural Revamp: The Legend of Xiaogang, SPIEGELONLINE, Nov. 7,
2008, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,589165,00.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2009).
2
Land Reform in China: Promises, Promises, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 16, 2008, available at
http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12437707#top.
3
Keliang Zhu et al., The Rural Land Question in China: Analysis and Recommendations Based on
a Seventeen-Province Survey, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 761, 769-70 (2006).
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considerable middle class has emerged.4 Although those living in the
Chinese countryside are better off than they were thirty years ago because of
land-use reform, rural residents have not seen an increase in living standards
commensurate with that of their urban counterparts.5 In fact, the income gap
between rural and urban China continues to increase.6 Because of these
widening inequalities, tension has grown in China’s rural areas,7 where tens
of thousands of peasant protests occur each year.8
The Chinese government views rural unrest as a threat to its stability
and continued economic growth.9 Aware of the growing frustration in the
countryside, the Chinese government and the Chinese Communist Party
(“CCP”) issued two policy documents in the last year, both of which concern
the government’s plans for strengthening the land-use rights of rural farmers.
On October 12, 2008, the CCP issued the Decision on Certain Issues
Concerning the Advancement of Rural Reform and Development (“2008
Decision”),10 which the CCP described as “the most significant land reform
package in three decades.”11 Three months later, on February 2, 2009, the
CCP together with the State Council, the highest executive organ of the
4
Maureen Fan, In Southeast China, Skepticism on Land Reforms, THE WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 30,
2008, available at http://en.chinaelections.org/newsinfo.asp?newsid=19409. Twenty-two percent of the
Chinese population is considered middle class. Fei-Ling Wang, Brewing Tensions While Maintaining
Stabilities: The Dual Role of the Hukou System in Contemporary China, 29.4 ASIAN PERSP. 85, 116
(2005).
5
See Fei-Ling Wang, supra note 4, at 101. Seventy-one percent of China’s population is
characterized as rural residents living in rural areas. Id. at 116.
6
Id. at 107 (stating that the gap in living standards and cultures of the urban and rural sectors has
become increasingly wide in recent decades).
7
China’s Rulers Discuss Land Reform, BBC NEWS, Oct. 9, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asiapacific/7660528.stm (last visited Nov. 20, 2009) (characterizing the tension in rural areas as a growing
frustration).
8
Land Reform in China, supra note 2.
9
Edward Cody, In Face of Rural Unrest, China Rolls out Reforms, THE WASHINGTON POST, Jan.
28,
2006,
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2006/01/27/AR2006012701588.html.
10
Zhong gong zhong yang guan yu tui jin nong cun gai ge fa zhan ruo gan zhong da wen ti de jue
ding [Decision on Certain Issues Concerning the Advancement of Rural Reform and Development]
(adopted by the Cent. Comm. of the Chinese Communist Party, Oct. 12, 2008), available at
http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2008-10/19/content_1125094.htm [hereinafter 2008 Decision]. (Note: Generally,
the 2008 Decision is divided up into numbered sections. Some of these sections consist only of
unnumbered paragraphs. Other sections consist of an unnumbered introductory paragraph followed by
numbered paragraphs. The Decision also contains an unnumbered introductory and concluding paragraph.
Thus, within this Comment, citations to the 2008 Decision will take the following forms: 1) a citation to a
section with only unnumbered paragraphs will consist of a section number (sec. [no.]) followed by a
paragraph number (para. [no.]) denoting the order in which the paragraph appears within that section; 2) a
citation to a section with an unnumbered introductory paragraph followed by numbered paragraphs will
consist of a section number followed by the number that labels the paragraph in that section; 3) a particular
section’s introductory paragraph will be cited using the section number and “introductory para.”; 4) the
introductory paragraph of the Decision itself will be cited to using “2008 Decision, introductory para.”)
11
Fan, supra note 4.
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Chinese government, released a document entitled Certain Opinions of the
State Council and the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party
on Promoting the Stable Development of Agriculture and Continuing to
Increase Farmers’ Incomes in 2009 (“2009 No. 1 Document”).12
(Collectively, the 2008 Decision and the 2009 No. 1 Document will be
referred to throughout as the “Policy Documents.”) The Policy Documents
articulate the government’s goals for rural development, including increasing
rural incomes by the year 2020 and providing for better implementation of
farmers’ land-use rights in order to maintain agricultural yield.13
The Chinese government and the CCP tout these policy developments
as a “breakthrough” that will create a “new upsurge” in rural reform.14 In
the current economic downturn, the Chinese government seems especially
keen to make rural Chinese citizens into domestic spenders as a way of
coming through the crisis with the economy intact.15 Indeed, the 2009 No. 1
Document explicitly states that farmers, and the countryside generally, have
great significance for expanding domestic demand, and are a highly
important factor in improving people’s livelihoods.16 Increasing the
prosperity of the countryside would benefit the Chinese economy as a whole
by increasing domestic demand.17 But rural residents are more skeptical. In
response to the 2008 Decision, a farmer named Li, who lives in the rice and
corn growing village of Xinyi in Guangdong province, stated that he did not
think the new reforms “will give us more protection. We have no
expectations.”18
This Comment argues that, viewing the policy documents in light of
the current legal regime that governs land-use rights, the changes espoused
in the Policy Documents are well-intentioned but ultimately insufficient to
raise living standards in the countryside, halt the conversion of agricultural
12

Zhong gong zhong yang Guo wu yuan guan yu er ling ling jiu nian cu jin nong ye wen ding fa
zhan nong min chi xu zeng shou de ruo gan yi jian [Certain Opinions of the State Council and the Cent.
Comm. of the Chinese Communist Party on Promoting the Stable Development of Agriculture and
Continuing to Increase Farmers’ Income in 2009] (adopted by the Cent. Comm. of the Chinese Communist
Party and the State Council, Dec. 31, 2008), available at http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/200902/01/content_1218759.htm [hereinafter 2009 No. 1 Document]. (Note: Within the 2009 No. 1 Document,
all paragraphs are numbered except for the four introductory paragraphs and the two concluding
paragraphs. This Comment cites to the numbered paragraphs with “para. [no.]”. This Comment cites to the
introductory paragraphs with “introductory para. [no.].”)
13
Id. introductory para. 2.
14
Land Reform in China, supra note 2.
15
China Stresses Domestic Demand in Stimulating Growth as Crisis Harms Export, GOV.CN, Mar.
5, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-03/05/content_10945808.htm. (last visited Nov. 3, 2009).
16
2009 No. 1 Document, supra note 12, introductory para. 4.
17
Fei-Ling Wang, supra note 4, at 108 (stating that “raising the purchasing power of the rural
Chinese majority would probably provide the Chinese economy with a great push in the years ahead”).
18
Fan, supra note 4.
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land, and provide for a more secure grain supply.19 Part II provides an
overview of the history of rural land-use rights in China since 1949 and the
current legal structure governing those rights. Part III introduces the
changes to current land-use law that the Chinese government and the CCP
have put forth through the Policy Documents. Part III also demonstrates that
these changes have the goals of maintaining grain supply and doubling
farmers’ incomes. Part IV argues that while the policy promoted by the
Chinese government has great potential, it fails to provide rural farmers with
stable land-use rights that will spur further economic growth and promote
rural stability. Part IV also includes recommendations to improve rural landuse rights. Part V concludes that the Chinese government’s most recent
policy, while a step in the right direction, does not constitute a
“breakthrough” in rural reform.
II.

SINCE 1949, RURAL LAND-USE LAW IN CHINA HAS EVOLVED TO
CONFER AN INCREASING NUMBER OF RIGHTS ON FARMERS

From the founding of the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”), 1949
to the present, Chinese farmers had only a brief opportunity to own farmland
outright.20 In 1951, the Chinese government started collectivizing rural land
ownership,21 and it was not until 1979 that farmers obtained individualized
use rights to the land they worked (i.e., farmers had rights to use pieces of
farmland for finite terms, but rural collectives still held ownership of the
land).22 Since then, the government has gradually extended the term of
farmers’ use rights and issued policy documents to better ensure that farmers
can hold their use rights for the full term.23 The newest legal developments,
including the Land Administration Law (“LAL”),24 the Law on the

19
Throughout this comment, the terms “land-use rights” or “use rights” mean the obligations and
benefits that flow from laws governing the way land is put to use.
20
Benjamin W. James, Expanding the Gap: How the Rural Property System Exacerbates China’s
Urban-Rural Gap, 20 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 451, 458 (2007).
21
Id.
22
Keliang Zhu & Roy Prosterman, From Land Rights to Economic Boom: A 17-Province Survey
Reveals That More Secure Land Rights Can Boost the Incomes and Consumption Power of China’s 850
Million Rural Residents, CHINA BUS. REV., July-Aug. 2006, at 46, available at
http://www.chinabusinessreview.com/public/0607/zhu.html.
23
See Ping Li, Rural Land Tenure Reforms in China: Issues, Regulations and Prospects for
Additional Reform, 3 LAND SETTLEMENT AND COOPERATIVES (SPECIAL EDITION) 59, 61 (2003), available
at http://www.rdiland.org/PDF/PDF_Publications/LP-RuralLandTenureReforms.pdf.
24
Land Administration Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., June 25,
1986, revised Dec. 29, 1988, Aug. 29, 1998, and Aug. 28, 2004, effective Aug. 28, 2004), translated in
http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI_EN/Laws/GeneralLawsandRegulations/BasicLaws/P020060620320252818
532.pdf (P.R.C.) [hereinafter Land Administration Law].
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Contracting of Rural Land (“RLCL”),25 and the Property Rights Law
(“Property Law”),26 have focused on strengthening farmers’ use rights while
maintaining China’s underlying socialist system of collective ownership for
rural land.27 This Section details the developments that occurred since the
PRC’s founding in 1949. Section A discusses the situation of rural land
rights in the PRC from 1949 until “reform and opening up” in 1978.28
Section B describes the introduction and development of individualized use
rights to farmland from 1978 onwards. Finally, Section C discusses the laws
currently in effect that pertain to rural land-use, and describes how the
difficulties in implementing these laws have caused social and economic
problems in the Chinese countryside.
A.

From 1949 to 1978, China’s Rural Property System was Largely
Characterized by Collective Ownership

Upon the founding of the PRC in 1949 under the leadership of the
CCP and Mao Zedong, the Chinese government confiscated rural land from
landlords and redistributed it to farmers, effectively granting farmers private
ownership of land.29 However, this situation did not last long. From 1951 to
1956, the CCP forced farmers to consolidate their land holdings into large
agricultural producers’ cooperatives comprised of about 160 households
each.30 Then, after 1958, the CCP decided to organize rural households into
giant “people’s communes” of around 5,000 households each, where
everyone contributed work to the best of his or her ability and received basic
necessities in return.31 Most of China’s rural land became collectively

25
Law on Land Contract in Rural Areas (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong.,
Aug. 29, 2002, effective Mar. 1 2003), translated in http://english.gov.cn/laws/200510/09/content_75300.htm (P.R.C.) [hereinafter Law on Land Contract in Rural Areas].
26
Property Rights Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 16, 2007,
effective Oct. 1, 2007), translated in http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/chn72735.pdf (P.R.C.) [hereinafter
Property Law].
27
These laws are described in more detail below. See infra Parts II.C.1, II.C.2, II.C.3, and II.C.4.
28
The period of “reform and opening-up” was marked by a wide-ranging program of social and
economic reforms, initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1978. U.K. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Country
Profile:
China,
http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/about-the-fco/country-profiles/asia-oceania/china?profile
=history&pg=30 (last visited Oct. 14, 2009). The reforms sought to modernize China’s economy, develop
China’s foreign relations (especially with Western countries), and implement gradual, limited liberalization
of Chinese society. Id.
29
James, supra note 20, at 458.
30
Id.
31
Id. at 459.
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owned and managed by the people's communes, with the exception of small
plots of homesteads (宅基地) and “self-reserved” lands (自留地).32
The total collectivization of agriculture marked the beginning of Mao
Zedong’s “Great Leap Forward,”33 an effort to quickly transform China into
an industrial power,34 which lasted from 1958 to 1961.35 Collectivization of
rural land allowed the State to reach into farmers’ grain supply, and the
government imposed compulsory sales of grain at a low fixed price.36 This,
coupled with a crippling grain shortage as well as natural disasters, led to
widespread famine and the deaths of ten to twenty million people, nearly all
of whom were rural farmers.37 Not until the late 1970s did farmers begin to
gain more rights to the land they worked.38
B.

The Household Responsibility System Provided Individual Farming
Households with Contractual Use Rights to Farmland

Deng Xiaoping’s rise to power as China’s de facto leader in 1978
began the period of “reform and opening up” (改革开放)39 and changed the
nature of rural land ownership as well.40 As part of Deng’s process of
“reform and opening up,” the Chinese government instituted the HRS
(家庭承包经营制度) in 1979.41 Under this system, village collective
economic organizations (“collectives”) allocated land-use rights to
individual households via contract,42 which was a change from the previous
arrangement where households only possessed the right to use homesteads
32

Frank Xianfeng Huang, The Path to Clarity: Development of Property Rights in China, 17
COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 191, 214 (2004). Self-reserved lands are small lots assigned to grow produce for selfconsumption. Theoretically, even these plots were collectively owned. Id. The Chinese legal term
“homestead” only refers to the portion of land on which a family’s home sits, and does not imply the same
legal protections as associated with this term in the United States. Geoffrey Korff, The Village and the
City: Law, Property, and Economic Development in Rural China, 35 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 399,
414 (2008).
33
This period was called the “Great Leap Forward” because Mao envisioned transitioning from
feudalism directly into communism, thereby “leaping over” a capitalist stage, which was normally required
in the Marxist historical framework. James, supra note 20, at 459.
34
Dennis Tao Yang, China's Agricultural Crisis and Famine of 1959–1961: A Survey and
Comparison to Soviet Famines, 50 COMPARATIVE ECONOMIC STUDIES 1, 1 (2008), available at
https://secure.palgrave-journals.com/ces/journal/v50/n1/pdf/ces20084a.pdf.
35
Id.
36
Ching Kwan Lee & Mark Selden, China's Durable Inequality: Legacies of Revolution and Pitfalls
of Reform, ASIA-PAC. J.: JAPAN FOCUS, Jan. 21, 2007, available at http://japanfocus.org/-M_-Selden/2329.
37
Id.
38
See Huang, supra note 32, at 215-16.
39
See U.K. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, supra note 28.
40
See Zhu & Prosterman, supra note 22, at 46.
41
Id.
42
Id.
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and “self-reserved” lands.43 The collectives distributed these land-use rights
in a largely egalitarian fashion, although differences among regions persisted
due to variations in land per capita.44
The HRS achieved some measure of success, but it did not guarantee
land-use rights for farmers in the long-term. Initially, from 1979 to 1984,
income in rural areas grew under the HRS by eleven percent each year,
resulting in the narrowest rural-urban income gap since the early 1970s.45
However, from 1983 to 1998, the duration of the use rights granted to
individual households and the frequency and types of administrative land
readjustments varied greatly from region to region.46 Because the HRS did
not legally require written land-use contracts, which could specify terms of
use of the allocated land or other significant privileges and obligations
associated with the use rights, the vast majority of Chinese farm households
did not have them. 47 These flaws in the HRS made it difficult for farmers to
rely on their land-use rights as a basis for any future planning of their
operations.48
To address these and other problems with the HRS, the Communist
Party issued a series of policy documents that attempted to improve the
security of farmers’ land-use rights by: 1) extending the terms of these
rights; and 2) limiting the ability of local officials to readjust the amount of
land a household could use.49 When the Chinese government first
introduced the HRS, farmers entered into land contracts for a period of three
years.50 Rural Work Document No. 1, which the Party issued in 1984, urged
local officials to prolong the contractual term of land-use rights to fifteen

43

See Huang, supra note 32, at 214.
Ping Li, supra note 23, at 60.
45
See Zhu & Prosterman, supra note 22, at 46.
46
See Ping Li, supra note 2323, at 60. This conclusion resulted from surveys conducted by the
Rural Development Institute during this 15-year period. Ping Li divides “readjustments” into
comprehensive and partial readjustments. Id. at 60 n.1. In comprehensive readjustments, all farmland in a
village is returned to the collective and redistributed among all households, assigning each household
entirely new land. Partial readjustments consist of adding to or taking from a household’s holdings as its
size changes.
47
See Ping Li, supra note 23, at 60. The new system also brought environmental consequences
because farmers used lands however they could to increase short-term gain without considering the longterm consequences of their actions. See Korff, supra note 32, at 409. For instance, land-use restrictions
were unclear, so many farmers with livestock allowed overgrazing, which negatively affected land quality.
Also, farmers' use of chemical fertilizer increased, resulting in polluted groundwater that generally
continues to affect all of China.
48
See Zhu et al., supra note 3, at 770-71.
49
See Ping Li, supra note 23, at 60-61.
50
Samuel P.S. Ho & George C.S. Lin, Emerging Land Markets in Rural and Urban China: Policies
and Practices, 175 CHINA Q. 681, 689 (2003).
44
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years or more.51 In 1993, the CCP Central Committee and the State Council
issued Document No. 11, stating that the use term could be extended for an
additional thirty years after the fifteen-year use term mentioned in the 1984
document expired.52 And in 1997, the Notice Concerning Further
Stabilizing and Protecting the Rural Land Contracting Relationship
(“Document No. 16”) re-emphasized the need to extend terms of use for
thirty years.53 This Notice also tackled the readjustment problem by clearly
prohibiting extensive readjustments, encouraging local adoption of a noreadjustment policy, and requiring approval of any minor readjustment plans
by two-thirds of the villager-assembly as well as by the township and
country governments.54 These policy documents addressed the problems
with length of use rights and frequent readjustments. In the years that
followed, the Chinese government essentially codified the measures in these
policy documents into formal laws, which similarly concentrate on
providing farmers with reliable use rights to their land.55
C.

Current Rural Land-Use Law Has Strengthened the Tenure Security of
Rural Farmers

The current PRC Constitution, adopted in1982 and amended in 2004,
provides the foundation for China’s legal system, including the rural landuse rights system.56 Three statutes give further shape to these land-use
rights: the 1986 LAL (土地管理法);57 the 2002 RLCL (土地承包法);58 and
the 2007 Property Law (物权法).59 Supplemented by policy statements
issued by the Party and the State Council, these laws form the main statutory
structure for rural land-use rights in China today. The following sections
describe the pertinent provisions of these laws in order to give context to the
subsequent discussion of current Chinese policy regarding those laws and
the rights that flow from them. Section 1 will set forth the major
constitutional principles governing the ownership of land in China. Sections
2, 3, and 4 then detail the laws that give further shape to the way land is held
and used. Through the different phases of the development of land-use law,
farmers’ land tenure rights have been increasingly strengthened.
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59

Ping Li, supra note 23, at 61.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See infra Parts II.C.2, II.C.3, and II.C.4.
See generally XIAN FA (2004) (P.R.C.).
Land Administration Law, supra note 24.
Law on Land Contract in Rural Areas, supra note 25.
Property Law, supra note 26.
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The Constitution Establishes the Principles of Rural Land-Use in
China

In contrast to constitutions that set up a system for private ownership
of land by individuals, the Chinese Constitution mandates ownership of land
by the state and collectives. Article 6 articulates the principle that “the basis
of the socialist economic system of the [PRC] is socialist public ownership
of the means of production, namely, ownership by the whole people and
collective ownership by the working people.”60 Article 6 does not, however,
identify the “collective” owner or elaborate on who comprises that group.
The basic principles of land ownership are laid out in Article 10, which
divides land in China into two categories: urban and rural.61 This article
establishes that “land in the cities is owned by the state and land in the rural
and suburban areas is owned by collectives.”62 These two articles taken
together prevent the private ownership of land in China. Article 5 further
prevents the Chinese legal system from permitting private land ownership by
stating “no law or administrative or local rules and regulations shall
contravene the Constitution.”63 Thus, the Chinese Constitution does not
leave any room for private persons to own land individually.
While it forbids individual ownership of land, the Chinese
Constitution does not prohibit individuals from obtaining use rights to land.
Indeed, Article 8 establishes the HRS discussed above.64 Further, Article 10
allows for the transfer of the use of land according to law.65 Article 10 also
mandates that those who use the land make “rational” use of it.66 This basic
structure of collective ownership of rural land and granting the issuance of
individual use rights to rural land serves as a foundation for the more
detailed provisions of the laws described below.
2.

The LAL Was Adopted to Strengthen the Administration of Land

The LAL is the most comprehensive land administration law in the
PRC67 and it legally implements many of the constitutional provisions
60

XIAN FA art. 6, § 1 (2004) (P.R.C.).
James, supra note 20, at 465.
62
XIAN FA art. 10, §§ 1, 2 (2004) (P.R.C.).
63
Id. art. 5.
64
Id. art.8. See supra Part II.B. “Working people” who are members of the collective have the right
to “farm plots of cropland and hilly land allotted for private use, engage in household sideline production,
and raise privately owned livestock.” XIAN FA art. 8, § 2 (2004) (P.R.C.).
65
XIAN FA art. 10, § 3 (2004) (P.R.C.).
66
Id. art. 10, § 5.
67
Isabelle I.H. Wan et al., A Professional’s Guide to PRC Land Legislation 106 (5th ed. 2004).
61
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discussed above. As such, it sets out several important provisions, including
rules about granting use rights to rural farmers through HRS contracts.68
The purposes of the LAL are to strengthen the administration of land,
safeguard the socialist public ownership of land, protect developing land
resources, and ensure the rational use and protection of cultivated land.69 To
accomplish those goals, Article 3 mandates that “[t]he people’s government
at all levels shall take measures to make an overall plan for the use of land to
strictly administer, protect and develop land resources and curb any illegal
occupation of land.”70 Article 4 elaborates, stating, “A strict control is to
place on the transformation of land for farm use to that for construction use
in order to control the total amount of land for construction use and exercise
a special protection on cultivated land.”71 On paper at least, these provisions
appear to provide a relatively high degree of tenure security not only to the
land itself, but also to the tenure rights of farmers.
The most pertinent provision to the current discussion, Article 14,
establishes the contractual rights of individual farmers under the HRS. It
reads, “[l]and collectively owned by farmers shall be contracted out to be
run by members of the collective economic organizations for use in crop
farming, forestry, animal husbandry, and fisheries production under a term of
30 years.”72 It further establishes that a written contract be formed and
signed between the contractee and the contractor.73 By signing the contract,
farmers agree to use the land rationally and for agricultural purposes.74
The LAL also contains provisions should a farmer want to alter his
land-use rights during the contractual term. Article 14 states, “[w]ithin the
validity of the contract, the adjustment of land contracted by individual
contractors shall get the consent from two-thirds majority vote of the
villagers’ congress or over two-thirds of villagers’ representatives.”75 This
consent must be approved on the township and country levels by requiring a
two-thirds vote of the village members before land may be reallocated.76
Finally, the LAL generally designates an organization to act in the
name of the collective owner of rural land, and provides for a registration
68

See generally Land Administration Law, supra note 24.
Land Administration Law, supra note 24, art. 1.
Id. art. 3.
71
Id. art. 4
72
Id. art. 14.
73
Id. The relationship established is between the farmer and the “collective” as the contractee and
contractor. Because farmers may not own land privately, if they want to farm a plot to the exclusion of
others, they must contract with the legal owners of the land, the collectives. James, supra note 20, at 468.
74
Land Administration Law, supra note 24, art. 14.
75
Id.
76
Id.
69
70
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system.77 However, these parts of the LAL are quite vaguely worded.
Article 10 states, “[i]n lands collectively owned by farmers[,] those [that]
have been allocated to villagers for collective ownership according to law
shall be operated and managed by village collective economic organizations
or villagers’ committee.”78 While appearing to designate a representative to
make decisions in the name of the collective owners of rural land, this article
leaves the term “village collective economic organizations” open to wide
interpretation. Article 11 provides for the registration of lands that are
collectively owned, stating that “[The] People’s government at the county
level shall register and put on record lands collectively owned by farmers
and issue certificates to certify the ownership concerned.”79 However, the
article fails to mandate registration at the local level or provide details about
how such a system should work. This Comment discusses these two
deficiencies in more detail below, as they are also present in the most current
Chinese policy on rural land-use rights.
3.

The Law on the Contracting of Rural Land Improves the Land-Use
System Established in the LAL

The RLCL, passed in 2002, expands on farmers’ contractual land-use
rights contained in the LAL by adding to those rights, delineating them in
greater detail and providing increased protections for those rights.80 Chapter
Two, Section 1 of the RLCL sets out the rights and obligations of the
contractor.81 One of the rights the contractor enjoys is to “[transfer] the right
to land contractual management,”82 a right that the LAL does not contain.
The RLCL specifically defines the scope of the transferability of land,
stipulating that farmers may lease, assign, exchange, and carry out other
transactions of contracted land, with the exception of sale and mortgage.83
77

Id. arts. 10, 11.
Land Administration Law, supra note 24, art. 10.
79
Id. art. 11.
80
See generally Law on Land Contract in Rural Areas, supra note 25, art. 1.
81
The “contractor” is defined within the RLCL as the “peasant household of the collective economic
organization concerned.” Id. art. 15.
82
Id. art. 16, § 1. We chose to translate the Chinese word “流转” as “transfer” and “转让” as
“assign.” The online English version of the RLCL translates “流转” as “circulate” and “转让” as
“transfer.” See generally Law on Land Contract in Rural Areas, supra note 25. However, we felt that
“transfer” is more idiomatic than “circulate” and is general enough to match the wider scope that the
meaning of “流转” encompasses. Also, “转让” has the more specific meaning of “assign.” See A
CHINESE-ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1660 (Revised ed. 1997) (where “转让” is translated as “transfer the
ownership of” and “转让人” is translated as “assignor.”) See also Huang, supra note 32, at 221 (in which
Huang translates the term “转让” as “assignment”).
83
Id. arts. 32-43.
78
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The RLCL also mandates that parties to a land-use rights transfer conclude a
written contract, and gives the particulars for what should be included in that
contract.84 In addition to granting the ability to transfer land-use rights, the
RLCL protects farmers’ rights to use the land by ending the practice of land
readjustment, something that was allowed by the LAL with a two-thirds
vote.85 The RLCL, like the LAL, does not identify the owner of the
collective or provide for a detailed registration system. Section IV of this
comment will focus on how these provisions could be strengthened to give
farmers even more secure land-use rights.
4.

The Property Law Adheres to the Concept of Socialist Collective
Ownership and Reiterates the Protections Found in the LAL and
RLCL

The Property Law, which became effective in October 2007,86
provides an equal measure of legal protection to the systems of property
ownership (state-owned, collectively-owned, and privately-owned) in China,
but does little to change the way that land is owned, managed, and used in
the rural areas.87 Primarily, the Property Law explicitly adheres to the basic
concept that rural collectives operate under a dual system with centralized
management overseen by the collective and decentralized operation falling
to the individual household under contract.88 In general, the law reiterates
the protections and structures provided for in the LAL and RLCL, and
although the law provides for protection of private property, the law
unequivocally repudiates the concept that the idea of private property would
extend to land or other properties exclusively owned by collectives.89
5.

The Development of the Chinese Countryside Continues to Lag
Behind That of Urban Areas Despite the Current Land-Use Legal
Regime

Chinese farmers view the rural land-use system as a major factor
preventing them from improving their financial status as their urban
84
Id. art. 37. The contract for transfer should include the same information as the original contract
between the household and the collective economic organization.
85
WAN ET AL., supra note 67, at 107.
86
Property Law, supra note 26.
87
See James, supra note 20, at 473-74 (stating that the new law does very little to change the
conditions of the peasants).
88
Property Law, supra note 26, art. 124.
89
See XIAN FA art. 10 (2004) (P.R.C.); Property Law, supra note 26, arts. 41, 56, 63.
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counterparts have done.90 In fact, the primary cause of rural unrest stems
from land-related conflicts.91 Despite the protections for rural land-use
rights codified within the LAL, the RLCL, and the Property Law, the ruralurban income gap steadily increased throughout the 1990s and into this
century.92 The inherent implementation problems that flow from the
Chinese governmental structure (including the weak judiciary and lack of
oversight and transparency in the government hierarchy) have been well
documented.93 In the rural land context, if reform in law or policy is to be
successful, it must be implemented at the grassroots level.94
Difficulties with implementation and enforcement of rural land-use
rights at the local level seem to be a central factor in the growing rural-urban
gap.95 The RLCL and LAL state that each household receive a contract for
their land-use rights, but not even half of all rural households hold a
registered contract to their land, and fewer still believe that their thirty-year
contract will be honored for its total duration.96 Fewer than two years after
the LAL was revised, the Ministry of Agriculture announced that ninetyeight percent of villages had implemented the contracting system.97
However, the implementation of the LAL was far less successful than the
statistics indicated, according to a survey of 1,600 households in seventeen
provinces conducted in 2005 by the Rural Development Institute (“RDI”).98
The survey showed that only forty-five percent of farm households had
received a written land-use contract,99 and surveys conducted by the same
organization in 1999 and 2001 indicated that only forty percent of

90

James, supra note 20, at 476.
See e.g., Zhu et al., supra note 3, at 766 (“[L]and-related conflicts . . . are now the top rural
grievance in China”).
92
Id. at 765.
93
See, e.g., IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 18 (Jianfu Chen et al.
eds., 2002) (describing the general situation regarding the implementation of law in China as
unsatisfactory, if not dismal or in crisis).
94
Zhu et al., supra note 3, at 834 (“[P]owerful evidence supports the view that any solution to these
issues must include, as a central element, providing farmers with greater tenure security. This requires
significant legal and policy reforms, and their concrete implementation at the grassroots level.”).
95
See id. at 833-34.
96
RURAL
DEVELOPMENT
INSTITUTE,
OUR
WORK:
CHINA,
http://www.rdiland.org/OURWORK/OurWork_China.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2009) [hereinafter RDI].
These numbers are based on sample surveys conducted in 1999 and 2001. Id.
97
Zhu et al., supra note 3, at 766.
98
See generally Zhu et al., supra note 3. RDI is a Seattle-based organization dedicated to securing
land rights internationally. See About RDI, http://www.rdiland.org/ABOUTRDI/About.html (last visited
Oct. 16, 2009).
99
Zhu et al., supra note 3, at 788.
91
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households were confident in their land tenure (that their land would not be
readjusted or expropriated).100
Additionally, the government can easily circumvent the protections
afforded by the LAL and the RLCL through the law of eminent domain,
which allows the government to expropriate a farmer’s land in the public
interest101 and requires the government to compensate the farmer at a very
low price if he or she is compensated at all.102 Additionally, rural farmers
are not entitled to the same free benefits to which urban dwellers are
entitled, such as basic medical care, elementary education, and social
security, thus deepening the disparity.103
Finally, the Chinese government and the CCP consider the rapid
conversion of arable land to non-agricultural use, which has been extensive
since the beginning of China’s economic reform, as a pressing issue.104 This
conversion is spurred by the growing needs of urban areas, including
urbanization, industrialization, and road construction.105 Such conversion is
surely troubling to a government focused on raising the income of its rural
residents by boosting productivity and maintaining farmland for grain
security purposes. The following sections examine how current Chinese
policy focuses on ameliorating these rural concerns by reinforcing the landuse rights of farmers under the current legal regime, and analyzes the
probable success of such attempts.
III.

THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT AND THE CCP SEEK TO MAINTAIN GRAIN
SUPPLY AND INCREASE FARMERS’ INCOMES BY INTRODUCING SEVERAL
POLICY CHANGES TO THE RURAL LAND-USE REGIME

In October 2008 and February 2009, respectively, the CCP Central
Committee (中共中央) issued two policy documents concerning rural
reform —the 2008 Decision and the 2009 No. 1 Document (collectively “the
Policy Documents”). The Policy Documents are arguably a part of the
current body of Chinese law concerning rural land-use rights, because
government officials often treat similar documents as having the force of
100

See RDI, supra note 96.
XIAN FA art. 10 (2004) (P.R.C.).
102
See Zhu et al., supra note 3, at 825-27. Studies have shown that it is typical for farmers to receive
only 10-20% of the compensation. Id. at 826. The rest is retained by the collectives or local governments.
Id.
103
Id. at 765. “Per capita government spending on social welfare for urban residents in the 1990s
was some thirty times greater than in rural areas.” Fei-Ling Wang, supra note 4, at 107.
104
See Samuel P.S. Ho and George C.S. Lin, Non-Agricultural Land Use in Post-Reform China, 179
China Q. 758, 760 (2004).
105
See id. at 762-64.
101
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law. The Policy Documents state reforms to the current rural land-use rights
system, which include indefinite terms in farmers’ land-use contracts,
growth of rural land-use rights markets, and maintaining the agricultural use
of farmland. The intended effects of these policy measures are to increase
farmers’ incomes and maintain grain security. Sections A and B will attempt
to situate the Policy Documents within the context of Chinese governance.
Sections C, D, and E will discuss the specific changes the Policy Documents
put forth and the goals that they hope to accomplish.
A.

The Policy Documents Reflect Larger Concerns about Stability in the
Chinese Countryside

The CCP Central Committee promulgated the 2008 Decision on
October 12, 2008, under the pressure generated by rural unrest and the
looming economic crisis.106 The focus of that session was rural reform and
development, in order to “build up a new socialist countryside.”107 In the
2008 Decision, the CCP lists the above-mentioned effects of the suggested
reforms, but also includes language that reflects its concern about stability in
rural areas. For instance, the CCP states its desires to “absolutely and
fundamentally eliminate the phenomenon of poverty,” and continually
designate the problem of feeding around a billion people as a high priority in
maintaining peace.108 Such goals indicate that the government believes
much work must still be done in order to promote a stable and productive
countryside.109
Likewise, the 2009 No. 1 Document forms a part of the CCP’s and
Chinese government’s work towards greater rural stability.110 Each
February, the CCP Central Committee together with the State Council issue
a policy directive, entitled the Number One Central Document.111 Since
2004, these directives have continually highlighted and attempted to address
the strides yet to be made to ameliorate the critical problems accompanying

106
See 2008 Decision, supra note 10; China Agrees to Land Reform Package, BBC NEWS, Oct. 12,
2008, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7665907.stm.
107
See 2008 Decision, supra note 10, introductory para.
108
Id. sec. 2, para. 4.
109
See id. sec. 1, paras. 4, 5 and 6.
110
2009 No. 1 Document, supra note 12. The 2009 No. 1 Document was issued jointly on February
1, 2009 by the CCP Central Committee and the State Council. Jun Wang, For the Livelihood of Farmers,
RADIO 86, Feb. 17, 2009, available at http://www.radio86.co.uk/china-insight/from-chinesemedia/9776/for-the-livelihood-of-farmers.
111
See No. 1 Central Document Focuses on Rural Issues for 5th Year, CHINAVIEW.CN, Jan. 30, 2008,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-01/30/content_7529372.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2009).
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the goal of rural development.112 Like those before it, this year’s Number
One Central Document primarily discusses rural reform.113
B.

The Policy Documents Will Likely be Followed by Government
Officials as if They Were Law

Before analyzing the Policy Documents that are the focus of this
Comment (the 2008 Decision and the 2009 No. 1 Document), it is vital to
understand the overall role that policy plays in Chinese governance.114 In
China, the distinction between law and policy is often blurred.115 Policy
directives issued by the Chinese government and/or the CCP are a common
form of government mandate and are followed by lower government organs,
even though they are not technically binding.116 Policy undoubtedly
embodies the principles that guide major official action as well as revisions
in the law.117 A glimpse into the treatment and trajectory of past directives
issued by the CCP and the State Council illustrates the important place of
112

See id. In the previous five No. 1 Documents, key phrases were “increasing farmers’ incomes”
(2004), “improving agricultural production capacity” (2005), “pushing forward the modern ‘countryside’
scheme” (2006), “developing modern agriculture” (2007), and “fortifying the base of agriculture and
seeking ways to integrate urban with rural areas” (2008).
113
Jun Wang, supra note 110.
114
The Policy Documents were issued by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party
and the State Council. The State Council is the chief administrative authority of the PRC and is most akin
to the cabinet of the executive branch in the United States government. KENNETH LIEBERTHAL,
GOVERNING CHINA: FROM REVOLUTION THROUGH REFORM 177 (2nd ed. 2003). Although the NPC is the
main legislative branch of the Chinese government, the State Council is empowered to issue regulations in
order to implement specific statutory provisions. XIAN FA art. 89 (2004) (P.R.C.). The State Council also
has the authority to issue normative documents entitled “resolutions” (jueyi) and “decisions” (jueding).
Jianfu Chen et al., supra note 93, at 119. Such documents have the force of law. Id.
115
ALBERT H.Y. CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA 95 (2004).
116
Zhu et al., supra note 3, at 771. The Policy Documents that are the focus of this comment are not
technically binding because the CCP, the body that issued the 2008 Decision and jointly issued the 2009
No. 1 Document with the State Council, is not empowered through the Constitution or the Law on
Legislation to make laws. And although the State Council, the joint issuer of the 2009 No. 1 Document,
and has the authority to make law, the 2009 No. 1 Document was not issued as a regulation or any other
kind of formally legally binding document.
117
A thorough exposition of the interaction between policy and law in China is not possible within
the confines of this comment. For a more detailed analysis, see generally MURRAY SCOT TANNER, THE
POLITICS OF LAWMAKING IN POST-MAO CHINA: INSTITUTIONS, PROCESSES, AND DEMOCRATIC PROSPECTS
(1999). In this book, Tanner explains the ill-defined relationship between the formal legal system and the
Communist Party: “The perennial debate over the relative authoritativeness of ‘laws’ versus Party ‘policy,’
a debate which has raged since the earliest years of the People’s Republic, has never been resolved with
any useful clarity. Many Party leaders and legal scholars have argued that laws possess a special
authoritativeness and stability because they reflect the Party’s distilled wisdom and experience, developed
in carrying out policy over a long period . . . . [T]he Party has never resolved the authoritativeness debate
by taking the above assertion to its appropriate logical conclusion and officially declaring state law superior
to Party policy.” Id. at 32-33.
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policy in Chinese governance. The treatment of the Central Committee’s
decisions demonstrates that policy has tangible, quasi-legal effects. First, in
China, the CCP shapes and decides all major political, social, and economic
policy issues.118 One source of such policy is the annual plenum of the CCP
Central Committee.119 Policy resulting from Central Committee plenums is
often given pro forma approval by the National People’s Congress (“NPC”)
during its annual meeting in March.120 Second, those in China talk about
policy as if it had binding legal effect. For example, in discussing the 2008
Decision, scholars and government advisers stated that the new policy would
allow rural farmers to engage in the unrestricted trade of their land-use
contracts.121
Also, government officials use policy during speeches to spur change
and encourage adherence to Party laws and policies. The latest example of
this phenomenon comes from the fourth plenary session of the seventeenth
CCP Central Committee, which convened in September 2009.122 The goal
of that plenum was to enhance democracy and fight corruption.123 In
October, a senior Chinese leader, Zhou Yongkang, referred to the policy
issued from the plenum and not Chinese law when he called for efforts to
improve the work of the Chinese judiciary.124 Anecdotally, these examples
show the strong role that policy plays in Chinese governance.
Additionally, policy issued by the Chinese government often
eventually becomes a part of the legal corpus. For example, in 1993, the
118
LIEBERTHAL, supra note 114, at 234 (stating that the “Chinese Communist party retains the power
to decide all major political, social, and economic policy issues.”). Lieberthal continues, “[T]he party’s
continuing relevance stems from its ongoing monopoly on the exercise of political power . . . . party bodies
make the major decisions on the major substantive issues that confront not only the government but all
public institutions.” Id. at 241. Also, according to Chinese law scholar Randall Peerenboom, the CCP
Central Committee is one of three groups that have lawmaking power in China (the other two are the State
Council and the NPC). RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD THE RULE OF LAW 223
(Cambridge 2002). Although the CCP has lost the ability to control unilaterally control the lawmaking
process, Party power has not disappeared. Id. at 189. In fact, “[t]he Party undeniably is still a major force,
capable of getting its way on key issues . . . .” Id.
119
LIEBERTHAL, supra note 114, at 174. The Central Committee meets once or twice a year to
discuss and announce policies. Id. The 2008 Decision was adopted by the third plenary session of the
Seventeenth CCP Central Committee. See 2008 Decision, supra note 10.
120
See, Edward Wong, China Announces Land Policy Aimed at Promoting Income Growth in
Countryside, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/13/world/asia/13china.html (last
visited Nov. 20, 2009).
121
Id.
122
See CPC Central Committee Closes Plenum, Vows to Enhance Democracy, Fight Corruption,
CHINA VIEW, Sept. 18, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-09/18/content_12075992.htm (last
visted Nov. 20, 2009.
123
Id.
124
Senior Chinese Leader Calls for Strengthened Efforts in Judicial Work, CHINA VIEW, Oct. 10,
2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-10/10/content_12208696.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2009).
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Chinese government and the CCP Central Committee issued a policy
directive that set forth the intention of providing farmers with thirty-year
contractual rights.125 The thirty-year policy was then implemented at the
village level and put into practice.126 Five years later, in 1998, the policy
provision was formally codified as law in the LAL.127
In short, policy in China operates differently than it does elsewhere in
the world; policy has immediate, tangible, and quasi-legal effects. Thus,
when discussing the Policy Documents that are the subject of this comment,
one must bear in mind that policy has repercussions beyond the four corners
of the documents. This is especially important when contemplating whether
the current policy of the Chinese government represents a “breakthrough” in
rural reform.
C.

The Policy Documents Suggest Three Main Changes to Current Rural
Land-Use Law

Taken together, the Policy Documents promote three major changes to
rural land-use law. First, the Policy Documents indicate that the contractual
land-use terms will expand from thirty to an indefinite number of years.
Second, the CCP and the government institute reforms that will spur the
growth of rural land-use rights markets. Finally, the CCP and the
government reinforce their commitment to maintaining the agricultural use
of farmland by mandating that agricultural land not be converted to nonagricultural uses.
1.

The Policy Documents Suggest that the Duration of Rural Contractual
Land-Use Rights Will be Indefinite

In both Policy Documents, the government emphasizes a desire to
eliminate the thirty-year time frame for farmers’ contractual land-use rights.
The language of both documents extends this thirty-year right indefinitely.
The 2008 Decision indicates the need to “[g]rant farmers more complete and
secure contractual land management rights; the stability of the present land
contract relationships is to be ensured and these relationships will remain
unchanged for a very long time” (“长久不变”) (emphasis added).128
125
Zhu et al., supra note 3, at 771. At that time, farmers had fifteen-year contractual rights in their
land and the government was concerned about the rural land-use tenure problem. Id.
126
Telephone Interview with Keliang Zhu, Staff Attorney, Rural Development Institute (Feb. 6,
2009).
127
Land Administration Law, supra note 24, art 14.
128
2008 Decision, supra note 10, sec. 3, para. 1.
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Similarly, the 2009 No. 1 Document mandates, “give farmers more complete
and guaranteed land contract rights, maintain the stability of the current land
contract relationship, [these relationships] will remain unchanged for a very
long time” (“长久不变”) (emphasis added).129
During the drafting of the 2008 Decision, the exact language referring
to farmers’ contractual term changed twice.130 One draft stated that
contractual rights would remain unchanged “for a long term”
(“长期不变”).131 The other stated that land-use rights would be “fixed
perpetually” (“永久不变”).132 The central leadership opted for the more
flexible language (“remain unchanged for a very long time”).133 Although
the 2008 Decision does not define the phrase, if the policy is implemented
by local governments, the land-use rights of farmers could be on par with or
possibly extend beyond those for urban dwellers, who currently enjoy
seventy-year rights to the land they occupy.134 Granting farmers indefinite
rights to farm their land would be an unprecedented step towards promoting
a more stable Chinese countryside that, coupled with the two changes below,
would represent a dramatic shift in the way that land is held and used.
2.

The Policy Documents Promote the Growth of Markets in Rural LandUse Rights by Removing Restrictions on Assignment and Providing
for Necessary Market Institutions

The Policy Documents also express a desire to create rural markets for
the transfer of land-use rights,135 specifically by providing the institutions
necessary to build up such markets and by removing the legal limit on
assignment of use rights contained in the RLCL.136 In the 2009 No. 1
Document, the CCP states as a goal: “Establish and perfect markets for
transferring contractual land management rights. . . . Encourage localities
that have the capacity to develop transfer service organizations to provide
information sharing, advice on regulations, valuation, contract signing
129

2009 No. 1 Document, supra note 12, para. 17.
Telephone Interview with Keliang Zhu, supra note 126.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
2008 Decision, supra note 10, sec. 3, para. 1; 2009 No. 1 Document, supra note 12, para. 17.
134
Cheng zhen guo you tu di shi yong quan chu rang he zhuan rang zan xing tiao li [Interim
Regulations Concerning the Assignment and Transfer of the Right to the Use of State-Owned Land in the
Urban Areas] (promulgated by the State Council, May 19, 1990, effective May 19, 1990), art. 12,
LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Nov. 3, 2009) (P.R.C.) (providing for the seventy-year land-use term);
Property Law, supra note 26, art. 149 (providing for automatic renewal).
135
2008 Decision, supra note 10, sec. 3, para. 2; 2009 No. 1 Document, supra note 12, para. 18.
136
See 2008 Decision, supra note 10, sec. 3, para. 2.
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services, and dispute resolution, etc. for the transferring parties.”137 This
statement demonstrates the CCP’s wish to build up markets for land-use
rights by providing for the supporting institutions to run them.
In the 2008 Decision, the CCP seems to suggest another way to
promote the development of markets for land-use rights: removing the
limitation on the assignment of use rights contained in RLCL Article 37.138
Within the RLCL, Article 32 lists four specific ways by which farmers can
transfer their land-use rights: subcontract, lease, exchange, and
assignment.139 Article 37 limits farmers’ use of assignment by requiring
them to obtain consent from the issuer of the land contract before assigning
their use rights to a third party.140 The 2008 Decision lists the same four
ways to transfer use rights as contained in RLCL Article 32:
Establish and perfect markets for transferring contractual land
management rights, allow farmers to transfer contractual land
management rights . . . by means of subcontract, lease,
exchange, assignment or entering into a joint-stock cooperative,
develop various forms of management on an appropriate
scale.141
Although both the 2008 Decision and the RLCL list the same four means of
transfer, the language of the 2008 Decision lacks the limitation on
assignment.142 By not including this limitation in the 2008 Decision, the
CCP seems to imply that farmers will not be subject to it in the future, and
will be able to more freely transfer their use rights to other parties using
rural use rights markets. As discussed in Section III.D below, more transfers
of use rights to farmland will likely result in the farming of larger plots,
which will likely lead to increased efficiency in crop production, higher
production levels, and thus an increase in farmers’ incomes and maintenance
of grain security.

137
138
139
140
141
142

2009 No. 1 Document, supra note 12, para. 18.
See 2008 Decision, supra note 10, sec. 3, para. 2.
Law on Land Contract in Rural Areas, supra note 25, art. 32.
Id. art. 37. See also Huang, supra note 32, at 221.
2008 Decision, supra note 10, sec. 3, para. 2.
Id.
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In an Effort to Halt the Non-Agricultural Use of Farmland, the Policy
Documents Mandate Agricultural Use of Farmland

Non-agricultural use of farmland is a pressing government concern.143
The LAL and the RLCL highlight the importance of maintaining the
agricultural use of farmland, but they fall short of prohibiting the use of
farmland for non-agricultural purposes. The LAL requires each province in
China to designate at least eighty percent of cultivated land as basic
farmland.144 Article 19 of the LAL states, “[s]trictly protect the basic
farmland and control the occupation of agricultural land for non-agricultural
purposes.”145 Article 22 elaborates, “[t]he amount of land used for urban
construction shall conform to the standards prescribed by the State so as to
make full use of the existing land for construction purposes, not to occupy or
to occupy as little agricultural land as possible.”146 And Article 38 stipulates
that unused land will be given priority development for agricultural
purposes.147 The RLCL also falls short of using mandatory language to
protect the agricultural use of land. Similar to the LAL, Article 8 of the
RLCL provides that contracted land may not be used for non-agricultural
purposes, without approval granted according to law.148
In contrast, the Policy Documents employ stronger language for the
protection of farmland. The 2008 Decision states that conversion of land to
non-agricultural use will not be allowed.149 In Section 19 of the 2009 No. 1
Document, the government directs that “the strictest system for the
protection of agricultural land and the strictest system for economizing land
use” must be implemented in each village.150 Specifically, localities must
designate basic farmland and establish a uniform system of farmland
protection.151 Also, the 2009 No. 1 Document strictly forbids localities from
adjusting their land-use plans or modifying the location of basic farmland
without government authorization.152 In addition, the 2009 No. 1 Document
calls for localities to examine the responsibilities and goals of local
143

See supra Part III.B.5.
Land Adminiatration Law, supra note 24, art. 34.
145
Id. art. 19, § 1.
146
Id. art. 22.
147
Id. art. 38.
148
Law on Land Contract in Rural Areas, supra note 25, art. 8.
149
The 2008 Decision dictates that local governments shall “guarantee that the total amount of basic
farmland does not decrease, that its use does not change, and that its quality improves.” 2008 Decision,
supra note 10, sec. 3, para. 2. The 2009 No. 1 Document similarly mandates that “it shall be forbidden
to . . . change the land’s use.” 2009 No. 1 Document, supra note 12, para. 18.
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governments relating to the protection of agricultural land.153 In furtherance
of such protection, localities are instructed to implement an audit system
calling for the termination of leaders and cadres who do not adhere to the
protection of cultivated land.154 Direct disciplinary action against local
government officials charged with management of rural land is a threat not
found in the LAL or the RLCL. By insisting that the amount of arable land
not diminish,155 the policy documents seem to strengthen the central
government’s commitment to prevent urban encroachment and provide for
grain supply security.
D.

The Two Major Objectives of These Policy Changes Are Increasing
Farmers’ Incomes and Maintaining Grain Security

The CCP and the Chinese government anticipate that the above three
changes to farmers’ land-use rights156 will achieve two major objectives: 1)
increase farmers’ incomes and 2) help maintain grain security. The Policy
Documents connect each objective to the three changes by describing the
changes and repeatedly mentioning the objectives throughout. In addition,
each objective reflects concerns that are grounded in China’s current reality.
1.

The CCP and Chinese Government Hope to Double Farmers’ Incomes

Both Policy Documents state the goal of increasing farmers’ incomes
in various places. Thus, it seems that increasing farmers’ incomes motivates
the policy measures the Documents describe, including the three changes to
farmers’ land-use rights. The 2008 Decision mentions “doubling farmers’
per-capita net incomes” early on as one of the “basic goals and tasks of rural
reform” to achieve by the year 2020.157 It also states increasing farmers’
incomes as a requirement for advancing scientific development,158 and lists
it as a criterion for assessing the performance of county officials.159 The title
of the 2009 No. 1 Document contains the words “Increase Farmers’
Incomes.”160 It also states that “wavering of farmers’ incomes must be
153

Id.
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2008 Decision, supra note 10, sec. 3, para. 2; 2009 No. 1 Document, supra note 12, para. 19.
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These changes are: making contractual use-rights terms indefinite, removing restrictions on
assignment and providing institutional support for rural use-rights markets, and maintaining the agricultural
use of farmland. See supra Parts III.C.1, III.C.2 and III.C.3.
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2008 Decision, supra note 10, sec. 2, para. 2. Specifically, this section of the document calls for
doubling farmers’ per capita income by 2020. Id.
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2008 Decision, supra note 10, sec. 1, para. 4.
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Id. sec. 6, para.1.
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See 2009 No. 1 Document, supra note 12, title.
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resolutely guarded against,”161 and that increasing farmers’ incomes should
be a criterion for measuring the performance of local officials.162 The
prominence of increasing farmers’ incomes in the Policy Documents
demonstrates that this goal motivates the CCP’s and the government’s policy
measures in the documents, which include the three changes to rural landuse rights.
The desire of the CCP to increase farmers’ incomes likely arises from
the widening gap in wealth and living standards between rural and urban
areas,163 as discussed above.164 In 1964, the average Chinese urban income
was 2.2 times the average rural income.165 By 2006, that difference
increased to 3.2.166 According to the National Bureau of Statistics of China,
the real growth rate of average rural incomes overtook the real growth rate
of average urban income (as of 2008); even so, the disparity between the
absolute annual incomes of rural and urban residents increased by a factor of
twelve from 1981 to 2008.167 In sum, the disparity between urban and rural
incomes is a very real problem that causes the CCP and Chinese government
great concern, which the Policy Documents reflect.
2.

Maintaining Grain Security is a Central Goal of the CCP and Chinese
Government

In addition to increasing farmers’ incomes, it appears that maintaining
grain security also motivates the measures set out in the Policy Documents,
since the Chinese government and the CCP repeatedly mention their
concerns about grain security at various points in the documents. According
to the 2008 Decision, “[S]olving the problem of feeding around one billion
people [must be] continually designated as a high priority in running the
161

Id. introductory para. 3.
Id. concluding para. 1.
163
See 2008 Decision, supra note 10, sec. 1, para. 5 (stating, “[D]isparities in regional development
and incomes of rural and urban residents are expanding, [and] changing the backward face of the
countryside becomes urgent”).
164
See supra Part II.C.5.
165
Fei-Ling Wang, supra note 4, at 107 (citing Yicai Zhong, Cheng xiang er yuan she hui de rong he
yu yin nong jin cheng [The Merging of the Dualistic Urban and Rural Societies and the Drawing of
Peasants Into Cities], SHE HUI KE XUE [SOC. SCI.] 54, 55 (1995)).
166
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS OF CHINA, CHINA STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 10-2 (2007),
available at http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2007/indexeh.htm. The authors of this comment calculated
this number by dividing the 2006 per capita annual disposable income of urban households by the per
capita net income of rural households.
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2008 nian san ji du jing ji shu ping: suo xiao cheng xiang shou ru cha ju ying dui guo ji jin rong
wei ji [2008 Three-Quarter Economic Review: Narrowing the Rural-Urban Income Gap to Respond to the
Global Financial Crisis] ZHONGGUO XIN XI BAO [CHINA INFORMATION TIMES], Nov. 7, 2008,
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjfx/ztfx/2005sbnjjsp/t20081107_402515209.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2009).
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country well and maintaining peace.”168 Also, as with increasing farmers’
incomes, the 2008 Decision lists maintaining grain security as a requirement
of scientific development.169 The 2009 No. 1 Document states that “[w]ith
the high base quotas resulting from five years of continuous increases in
agricultural production, the task of maintaining grain security and
development has become ever more onerous . . . .”170 In the same paragraph,
the document states that “decreases in grain production must be resolutely
guarded against.”171 Thus, it is apparent that the Policy Documents connect
the CCP’s and government’s worries about grain security to the policy
measures that the Documents enumerate, which include the three changes to
farmers’ land-use rights.
Statistical data confirm the Chinese government’s concerns about
grain security.172 Between 1984 and 2002, the level of security in China’s
supply of grain products consistently decreased.173 In particular, from 1997
to 2002, consumption of grain in the form of animal feed contributed in
large part to an increase in demand and decrease in supply of grain in China,
resulting in a grain shortage.174 However, increased demand for animal feed
is not the only cause of China’s shrinking grain supply; the continually
decreasing amount of farmland in China is also diminishing its grain
reserves.175 Among the many factors that influence a country’s food
production and supply, the amount of available farmland is one of the most
crucial.176 In the case of China, many experts agree that loss of farmland is
undermining China’s food production capacity.177
This information
demonstrates that the CCP’s and government’s goal of maintaining grain
security is not only connected to the three changes to use rights mentioned
above, but it is also grounded in the reality of low grain production levels in
China.
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See Peng Li et al., Cong shi wu bao zhang zhuang kuang kan Zhongguo dang qian liang shi an
quan [Viewing China’s Current Grain Security through the Situation of Food Security], 6 ZHONGGUO
NONG CUN JING JI [CHINESE RURAL ECON.] 4, 8-10 (2005).
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Baiming Chen, The Existing State: Future Change Trends in Land-Use and Food Production
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The Three Use Rights Changes Will Contribute to Achieving the
CCP’s and Government’s Goals in the Policy Documents

Providing farmers with use rights of an indefinite term, maintaining
the agricultural use of farmland, and facilitating trade in land-use rights will
contribute to achieving the CCP’s and government’s goals of increasing
farmers’ incomes and maintaining grain security. The three changes
promote these goals by increasing farmers’ rates of long-term investment in
their contract land, boosting agricultural production, and limiting the amount
of farmland converted to non-agricultural land. As such, the changes will
probably play an important, perhaps even essential, role in achieving the
CCP’s and Chinese government’s goals.
1.

Indefinite Terms for Rural Land-Use Rights Will Further the CCP and
Government’s Policy Goals

Making farmers’ use rights indefinite will provide farmers with
greater assurance that they will profit from their investments. Indefinite userights terms allow for long-term, land-saving investments; enable farmers to
avoid negotiations for a new use-rights contract; and increase farmers’
confidence that their heirs will profit from investments they make. With
greater assurance that they will reap a profit from long-term investments,
farmers will actually make these investments, which will aid in achieving
the CCP’s and Chinese government’s policy goals of increasing incomes and
maintaining grain security.
Various studies have documented the connection between indefinite
use rights terms and Chinese farmers’ increased investment in their land.
One study conducted in 1994 in Hebei Province concluded that the longer
the time a farmer knows he or she can farm a plot, the more likely he or she
is to make long-term, land-saving investments.178 Another report from RDI,
based on 1994 fieldwork in Anhui and Shandong, stated that most farmers
interviewed “would make significant incremental improvements [to their]
land under a policy of perpetual use rights.” 179 Hence, empirical evidence
suggests that farmers in China take the length of their use rights term into
account when deciding whether to invest in their farmland. Currently,
178
See Scott Rozelle et al., Tenure, Land Rights, and Farmer Investment Incentives in China, 19
AGRIC. ECON. 63, 68-69 (1998). These investments include the use of organic manure and phosphate
fertilizer. See id. at 68. They also include repairs to irrigation facilities, land leveling, employment of
advanced farming technology, or diversification into value-added crops. Zhu et al., supra note 3, at 808.
179
ROY PROSTERMAN ET AL., RURAL DEV. INST., REFORMING CHINA’S RURAL LAND SYSTEM: A
FIELD REPORT 28 (1994).
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farmers have contractual terms of thirty years in which to realize their
investments.180 This may seem like a considerable amount of time.
However, the studies indicate that granting farmers an indefinite term for
their use rights will motivate them to make even more long-term investments
than they do now.181
In addition, indefinite use terms allow farmers to avoid having to bear
the burden of negotiating a renewal of their contracts with local officials,
resulting in use rights that are more stable than the ones farmers currently
possess. Presently, a farmland contractor (i.e. a farming household) “may
continue the contract according to the relevant national rules” after the
contract’s thirty-year term has ended.182 It seems logical, though, that a
contract with an indefinite term would be more stable than the current
limited-term contracts, in spite of farmers’ ability to renew the limited-term
contracts. Under a limited-term contract, the contractor must affirmatively
negotiate a renewal with the collective, which might require him or her to go
through bureaucratic hassles and make concessions to obtain a new contract.
Under a contract with an indefinite term, the contractor must only bear such
a burden if the collective moves to terminate the contract.183
Finally, indefinite terms for land-use rights enable farmers to better
ensure that their children can keep this important income source within their
families. In the current use rights system, a farmer’s use rights contract can
be inherited.184 Although the children can negotiate for a new contract when
180

Land Administration Law, supra note 24, art. 14.
See PROSTERMAN ET AL., supra note 179, at 29 (stating that even when farmers have been clearly
told that they have fifteen-year ownership rights, they do not make long-term investments, and that farmers
will not feel secure in their use rights unless they are granted perpetual use rights with the right of
inheritance).
182
Property Law, supra note 26, art. 126. It is not clear to which “relevant provisions” the Property
Law alludes to here. James, supra note 20, at 474.
183
Of course, the stability of contractual land-use rights under indefinite land-use contracts would
also depend on the types and variety of reasons that collectives could invoke to terminate those contracts.
However, since current laws do not allow for the creation of indefinite land-use contracts, they also do not
specify reasons that collectives could invoke to terminate such contracts. See generally Land
Administration Law, supra note 24; Law on Land Contract in Rural Areas, supra note 25; and Property
Law, supra note 26. Thus, because these reasons are not specified, the authors cannot make any definite
assertions about the effect that reasons for termination would have on the stability of land-use rights under
such contracts.
The comparative stability that indefinite use terms provide is also conditioned on how well local
governments implement the restriction on readjustments in the RLCL. See supra Part II.C.5. There is
recent evidence that problems in implementing this provision still exist. According to RDI’s 2005
seventeen province survey, 30.3% of villages that had contracted with farmers to give them thirty-year
rights nevertheless readjusted land allocations after those contracts were formed. Zhu et al., supra note 3,
at 794.
184
According to the RLCL, “The benefits derived from the contract which are due to contractor shall
be inherited in accordance with the provisions of the Succession Law.” Law on Land Contract in Rural
Areas, supra note 25, art. 31.
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the inherited contract ends, if the contract they inherit has an indefinite term,
they do not have to negotiate and will more likely continue making longterm investments in the land.
In sum, indefinite use rights terms will prove to be more stable than
the current limited use rights terms, boosting farmers’ confidence that they
(and their children) will realize a return on their investments. More stable
use rights will motivate them to make longer-term, land-saving investments
in their contracted land. Such investments will increase agricultural
production levels,185 thereby contributing to increasing farmers’ incomes and
to maintaining grain security.
2.

Prohibitions on Conversion of Agricultural Land Will Also Further the
CCP and Chinese Government’s Policy Goals

By helping to slow the conversion of farmland to non-agricultural
land, prohibitions against such conversion will also boost farmers’
confidence in the profitability of their investments, thereby aiding in the
achievement of the CCP’s and Chinese government’s two main policy goals.
In the two decades before 2003, village officials and cities converted a large
amount of rural land to non-agricultural uses, and much of the converted
land was farmland.186 Once a farmer’s contracted land is used for a nonagricultural purpose, he or she cannot continue to farm the land and realize a
profit from any investment he or she has made in the land. If rules are
instituted that prohibit and deter these conversions, farmers will gain more
confidence that enough time is available for their investments in the land to
pay off.187 Consequently, they will invest more in their contracted land, with
the effect of increasing agricultural production.188 Increases in production
will in turn help achieve the government and the CCP’s two main policy
goals, especially the goal of maintaining grain security. Such prohibitions
against conversion to non-agricultural use will help maintain a specific
amount of land available for grain production. As stated above, the
185
See Zhu et al., supra note 3, at 808 (stating that mid- to long-term investments will likely lead to
significant increases in volume, productivity, and value of agricultural and other land-based production).
See also PROSTERMAN ET AL., supra note 179, at 11 (stating that farmers interviewed in 1994 made few
long-term investments to their land despite their awareness that doing so would increase their productivity).
186
See Ho & Lin, supra note 50, at 693.
187
See Zhu et al., supra note 3, at 808 (“[S]ecure, long-term land rights confirmed in right-specifying
documents have been considered a necessary condition for farmers making mid- to long-term investments
on land when they are reasonably certain that they will be able to recoup the full value of the
investments.”). See also id. at 770-71 (“Farmers will not make mid- to long-term investments on a land
parcel which they may not possess the next year or year after . . . .”).
188
See id. at 808.
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decreasing amount of agricultural land in China is threatening its grain
supply.189 But if prohibitions are in force that limit the speed at which
farmland is converted to non-agricultural uses, China can maintain enough
of its land for grain production, and avert the looming threat of a grain
shortage due to an insufficient amount of farmland available for grain
production.
3.

Building up Markets to Promote Trade in Land-Use Rights Will
Likewise Further the Policy Goals of the CCP and the Chinese
Government

Lastly, facilitating trade in land-use rights will result in more efficient
farming. In addition, markets will increase the value of farmland, providing
farmers with a large source of wealth with which to make investments in
their land. More efficient farming and an added impetus to increase
investments in farmland will increase production levels, thereby helping to
achieve the policy goals of increasing farmers’ incomes and maintaining
grain security described above.
Thriving markets for rural land-use rights would facilitate
consolidation of those rights, resulting in more efficient farming and
increased production levels. Research indicates, however, that rural markets
in land-use rights are still in developing stages.190 Specifically, the unstable
nature of farmers’ land-use rights constrains these markets, since transferees
in such markets cannot be sure that they will possess the use rights sold to
them in the long-term.191 It has been argued that facilitating the growth of
rural markets in land-use rights will “allow for ‘voluntary, gradual
reallocation’ of land rights to the most efficient users [of the farmland],
either farmer households or even large-scale agribusiness[es].”192 Since
farmers and agribusinesses can work larger plots of land more efficiently,
and increased efficiency logically results in increased production, they can
increase agricultural production levels if they can consolidate their holdings
of land-use rights.
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Thriving markets for rural land-use rights would also increase the
value of those use rights.193 With value added to their land-use rights,
farmers could make more long-term investments in their land.194 More
investments in farmland would in turn increase production.195 Hence, like
the increase in efficiency described above, the added value to land-use rights
would also enhance agricultural productivity.
By calling for the build-up of markets for rural land-use rights as well
as the maintenance of farmland for agricultural use and indefinite use rights
terms, the CCP and the Chinese government hope to increase farmers’
incomes and maintain the nation’s grain security. It appears likely that the
three changes in the current system of land-use rights will contribute
significantly to achieving those goals. However, the question remains
whether additional measures are necessary to do so.
IV.

THE THREE CHANGES MENTIONED IN THE POLICY DOCUMENTS
REQUIRE SEVERAL ACCOMPANYING MEASURES TO BE SUCCESSFUL

The Policy Documents introduce many positive measures. The three
policy changes fall short, however, of representing a “breakthrough” in rural
reform. In order for the policy to be successful, the Chinese government and
the CCP must specify which organization has authority to exercise collective
ownership rights, create a registration system for land-use rights to farmland,
and educate farmers about those rights.
A.

The Chinese Government Should Designate the Natural
Village/Villagers’ Group as the Rural Organization That Exercises
Collective Ownership Rights

While the reforms to land-use rights in the Policy Documents ensure a
greater degree of land tenure security for farmers, they fail to specify exactly
who represents rural collectives and exercises ownership rights to
collectively-owned agricultural land. For instance, the 2009 No. 1
Document states the goal of “plac[ing] ownership rights in the hands of the
collective organization that is the legally-determined [entity] to exercise
ownership rights,”196 but does not specify which organization is meant. This
193
KELIANG ZHU & ROY PROSTERMAN, CATO INST. CENTER FOR GLOBAL LIBERTY AND PROSPERITY,
SECURING LAND RIGHTS FOR CHINESE FARMERS: A LEAP FORWARD FOR STABILITY AND GROWTH, 10
(2007), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/dpa/DPA3.pdf.
194
Id.
195
See Zhu et al., supra note 3, at 808.
196
2009 No. 1 document, supra note 12, para. 17.
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lack of an identifiable collective owner is nothing new to the Chinese legal
system; the LAL and the RLCL only refer to the “collective” as the legal
owner of collectively owned land without specifying who this “collective”
is,197 and the 2007 Property Law likewise falls short of resolving this
ambiguity.198 In fact, this ambiguity has allowed local rural governments in
China to implement a structure in which higher-level and not lower-level
organizations in the rural collective hierarchy exercise ownership rights.199
The ambiguity has also made it easier for township and village cadres to
illegally convert collective farmland to commercial use by negotiating deals
without consulting the farmers with use rights to that land.200 To remedy
these problems, the CCP and the Chinese government should designate the
villagers’ group, which villagers form out of a democratically elected
body,201 as the single rural organization with authority to act as the owner of
collective farmland. Otherwise, the urbanization process and haste to
develop real-estate and industry in China will continue to threaten farmers’
land-use rights, regardless of the term length of these rights.
The nonexistence of a legally designated holder of collective
ownership rights to rural land has been a problem since the dismantling of
the commune system in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The communes
contained three levels: the commune, the production brigade, and the
production team.202 In 1962, the production team was identified as the
owner of agricultural lands.203 After this system was dismantled and the
197
See, e.g., Land Administration Law, supra note 24, art. 2 (naming the State and the collectives as
the owners of land, and specifying the State Council as the body that exercises ownership rights to Stateowned land); see, e.g., Land Administration Law, supra note 24, art. 8 (stating that farmers collectively
own rural and suburban lands, but not naming a specific organization); Land Administration Law, supra
note 24, art. 10 (naming collective economic organizations or villagers’ committees as the managers and
administrators of collectively owned land, but only mentioning the “collectives” as the owners); see also
Law on Land Contract in Rural Areas, supra note 25, art. 12 (referring to situations where peasants in a
village own land collectively, but failing to specify the organization that represents the peasant
landowners).
198
See Property Law, supra note 26, art. 60 (“The exercise of the ownership of the collectivelyowned lands . . . shall be in accordance with provisions as follows: (i) As to those owned collectively by
peasants of a village, the village’s collective economic organization or villagers’ committee shall, on behalf
of the collective, exercise the ownership . . . .” But the law does not define the “collective” or clearly
designating villagers’ committees as the holder of the ownership rights).
199
See Peter Ho, Who Owns China’s Land? Policies, Property Rights and Deliberate Institutional
Ambiguity, 166 CHINA Q. 394, 408 (2001).
200
See Ho & Lin, supra note 50, at 690, fig. 3; Ho, supra note 199, at 409-10.
201
Cun Min Wei Yuan Hui Zu Zhi Fa [Organic Law of Villagers’ Committees] (promulgated by
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Nov. 4, 1998, effective Nov. 4, 1998), arts. 10, 11,
http://www.mca.gov.cn/article/zwgk/fvfg/jczqhsqjs/200709/20070900001715.shtml (last visited Nov. 3,
2009) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter Organic Law of Villagers’ Committees].
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Ho, supra note 199, at 404.
203
Id. at 405.
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HRS was instituted, the township/town (乡/镇) replaced the commune, the
administrative village (行政村) replaced the brigade, and the natural
village/villagers’ group (自然村/村民小组)204 replaced the production
team.205 The natural village/villagers’ group is the basic unit of this rural
collective hierarchy.206 According to the PRC Organic Law of Villagers’
Committees, the villagers’ group is a subset of the villagers’ committee,207
which is a body that a village’s inhabitants democratically elect every three
years.208
Although the natural village/villagers’ group should have logically
replaced the production team as the designated owner of collectively held
rural land,209 the Chinese government has yet to designate such an owner.
The revised Land Administration Law and the interpretation issued by the
NPC Legal Committee fail to specify the organization that is the legal holder
of collective ownership.210 This law only states, “The land owned by the
farmers’ collective is by law owned by the farmers’ collective of the
village.”211 The 2007 Property Law also does not specify a single
organization in the rural collective hierarchy (township/town, administrative
village, natural village/villagers’ group) to exercise collective ownership
rights. It states that either the village’s collective economic organization or
the villagers’ committee shall exercise ownership rights to collectively held
lands,212 but leaves the ambiguity in place by not choosing a single
organization to exercise ownership rights and not defining the “collective
economic organization.”213
As a consequence of this ambiguity, local rural governments can
implement a structure of land ownership rights that prevents the natural
village/villagers’ group from claiming ownership to collectively held rural
204
The natural village and the villager’s group both refer to the same entity. See Margo RosatoStevens, Peasant Land Tenure Security in China's Transitional Economy, 26 B.U. INT'L L.J. 97, 124-25
(2008).
205
Ho, supra note 199, at 405.
206
See Rosato-Stevens, supra note 204, at 125.
207
Organic Law of Villagers’ Committees, supra note201, art. 10.
208
Id. art. 11.
209
See Ho, supra note 199, at 405, 408.
210
Id. at 405-06.
211
Id. at 405.
212
Property Law, supra note 26, art. 60. (“The exercise of the ownership of the collectively-owned
lands . . . shall be in accordance with provisions as follows: (i) As to those owned collectively by peasants
of a village, the village’s collective economic organization or villagers’ committee shall, on behalf of the
collective, exercise the ownership . . . .”).
213
See id. According to Margo Rosato-Stevens, the Property Law “simply includes the ability to
exercise ownership rights in the bundle of management rights that had already existed under Articles 8 and
10 of the Revised Land Administration Law for each of the tiers (village, administrative village, and
township).” Rosato-Stevens, supra note 204, at 125.

152

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 19 NO. 1

land.214 In practice, the administrative village, under supervision of the
township, usually acts as the formal party issuing a land contract in the name
of the collective—not the natural village/villagers’ group.215 A Chinese
government official was quoted as saying, “It is like the ownership rights to
land have been silently stolen from the natural village and vested in a level
higher.”216 Thus, as long as no legally designated owner of collective rural
land exists, localities are free to implement a system in which higher-level
collective organizations exercise ownership rights to rural land instead of the
natural village/villagers’ group.
In addition to preventing the most basic level of the collective
hierarchy from exercising ownership rights to collectively owned land, the
current legal ambiguity also facilitates township or village cadres’ illegal
conversion of collective land to commercial use. The conversion of
collectively owned agricultural land to land that can be used for commercial
purposes normally requires a transfer of ownership title from the collective
organization to the state.217 In spite of this requirement, sometimes township
or village cadres approve the construction of commercial developments on
collectively owned agricultural land without transferring title from the
collective to the state, and often do so in their personal capacity.218 It seems
that if Chinese laws designated the natural village/villagers’ group as the
organization to exercise collective ownership rights, the natural village
would have more power to stop township and village cadres from effectively
representing the collective in these development deals. Thus, the CCP and
the Chinese government should grant the authority to exercise collective
ownership rights to the natural village/villagers’ group, because it is formed
from a democratically elected body,219 and would provide farmers with
stronger representation of their interests in the face of the push for
development.
B.

The Policy Documents Include Proposals for a Land-Use Rights
Registration System, but These Proposals Are Not Comprehensive

In China there is currently no land registration system in rural areas.220
A land registration system is necessary for a fully developed market
214

See Ho, supra note199, at 409.
See id. at 408. Because Professor Ho’s article was published in 2001, some of this information is
potentially outdated. However, the problem of the legal ambiguity remains.
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economy because it gives land users security to make investments in their
land, increasing productivity and boosting incomes. 221 Therefore, without
secure land-use tenure, land is rendered what the Peruvian economist
Hernando de Soto has dubbed “dead capital.”222 The 2007 Property Law
calls for the creation of a unified, national registration system for real
properties, which includes land and houses.223 The law fails to specify,
however, how such a system should be created, which government agency
will be in charge, or how a new rural land registration system should be
merged with the urban one.224 The Policy Documents indicate, nevertheless,
that the government and the CCP are aware that registration is a crucial
component to providing stability to the countryside. Like the Property Law,
the 2009 No. 1 Document reiterates that a rural land contracting system
should be established, but it also does not instruct local governments on how
to implement such a system.225 The Chinese government will fail to provide
farmers with more secure contractual land-use rights if land-use rights are
not registered, farmers do not have a record of their land rights, no record of
those rights is filed and maintained with the local government, and farmers
are not educated about the terms of their use rights.
1.

The Chinese Government Must Create a Registration System for Rural
Land

The lack of a registration system for rural land creates uncertainty and
hampers the formation of land markets.226 According to Tim Hanstad, CEO
of the Rural Development Institute, “Land is a fundamental resource that is
most effectively used and exchanged when the rights to land are
registered.”227 Although Hanstad discusses registration systems in terms of
ownership of or title to the land, his argument can be extended to use rights
221
See generally Tim Hanstad, Designing Land Registration Systems for Developing Countries, 13
AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 647 (1998).
222
HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND
FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE, 6 (2000). The term “dead capital” is premised on the idea that where land, one
of the greatest assets for the world’s poor, cannot be freely transferred or sold in the market, its value is
greatly diminished. Understanding the potential value of land can play a key role in the overall process of a
country’s economic development as well as political stability. Zhu et al., supra note 3, at 784; see also Zhu
et al., supra note 3 at 808.
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or tenure in the land. Land tenure security encourages farmers to invest in
their land, which increases agricultural productivity.228
A working
registration system also allows for the formation of a land market.229
Registration systems facilitate this process by removing obstacles to market
formation such as procedural difficulties in transferring land, lack of
necessary information, and unclear delimitation of individual and group
rights, among others.230 Further, written documentation of contractual land
rights leads to improved transparency, predictability, and reduces land-use
disputes.231
2.

Additionally, the Chinese Government Must Issue Land Contracts and
Certificates to All Farmers

China has required written documentation of rural land rights
contracts through regulations since 1997,232 and by law since the LAL was
revised in 1998.233 Enhanced security of land-use rights through written
contract has been demonstrated to increase the likelihood that farmers will
invest in their land. For instance, RDI's 2005 survey provides evidence that
farmers who possess formal documentation of land-use rights are more
likely to invest in their land than farmers who do not possess this
documentation.234 Also, farmers who possess certificates or contracts that
comply with the requirements of the RLCL are more likely to invest in their
land than those who possess non-compliant contracts or certificates.235
Increased investment rates will likely result in substantially higher
production levels, 236 which will in turn increase rural incomes and help
ensure grain security.
The 2005 RDI study further shows that enforcement of this
requirement has been lackluster. Just forty-five percent of polled farmers
had been issued a written land-use contract to their land.237 Certificates were
issued about half the time (fifty-three percent).238 Approximately sixty-three
228
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percent of farm households had been issued a contract, a certificate, or
both.239 The majority of the contracts were issued during the three-year
period after the enactment of the LAL in 1998, with the rate declining after
2000.240
Compliance with the substance of the RLCL is another issue. After
the RLCL was enacted in 2002, China did not experience a similar peak in
the issuance of contracts and certificates.241 The content of contracts and
certificates was set forth in that law.242 The contracts and certificates
examined by RDI, troublingly, were compliant only 6.7% and 8.3% of the
time, respectively.243 Without higher numbers achieved through effective
implementation of the contracting laws already in place, creation of an
effective registration system seems unlikely. Likewise, if China institutes a
registration system for agricultural land-use rights, such a system must not
only enhance security of possession of legal land-use rights, but must also
strengthen farmers’ ability to exercise those rights. Therefore, the Chinese
government must not only ensure that an effective registration system is in
place, it must also educate farmers about those use rights.
C.

Rural Farmers Must Be Educated about Their Land-use Rights for the
Three Changes to Have their Intended Effect

In order to ensure the effectiveness of enhanced rural land-use rights,
the CCP should also commit to better education about land-use rights for
land contractors. It should not just generally commit to supporting rural
legal education, as it does in the 2008 Decision.244 Without a specific
commitment to educate farmers about the changes to their use rights in the
Policy Documents, farmers will likely stand defenseless against local
officials who illegally readjust or convert the use of their contractual
farmland. Also, education about land-use rights is necessary to increase
household, and their content varies by region. A certificate is designed by the provincial government and is
uniform in its content and format. Certificates do not require farmer signatures to be valid. Id.
239
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240
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241
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242
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information that every land-use contract should “in general” contain, including: 1) the names of the party
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party giving out the contract and the representative of the contractor; 2) the name, location, area, and
quality grade of the contracted land; 3) the term of the contract and the dates of beginning and end; 4) the
purpose of use of the contracted land; 5) the rights and obligations of the party giving out the contract and
the contractor; and 6) liability for breach of contract. Id.
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farmers’ investments in their contractual land,245 and to potentially increase
agricultural productivity.246
The 2005 RDI study demonstrated that large percentages of Chinese
farmers lacked valuable information about various aspects of the land-use
rights system.247 For instance, 43.4% did not know that farmers may
transfer or lease their contracted land (not including assignment of use
rights) without the collective’s consent, and 49.3% of farmers did not know
that when someone in their household dies, his or her contracted land need
not be returned to the collective.248
Admittedly, farmers might have become more educated about their
land-use rights in the past four years, but even such a change would not
demonstrate a firm commitment of the government and the CCP to educate
farmers about the enhanced land-use rights in the Policy Documents. The
2008 Decision only makes a general commitment to “[s]trengthen
information distribution and education about the legal system in the
countryside . . . [and] increase farmers’ consciousness of the law,”249 not a
specific commitment to educate farmers about the land-use rights listed in
the Decision. Thus, even if these improved rights are codified into law, it is
unclear from the Decision’s statement to what extent the CCP plans to
educate farmers about those rights.
Granting farmers perpetual use rights and a more complete ability to
trade their use rights will not benefit them if they lack knowledge of the
content of the rights and how to exercise them in the first place. A farmer
who is unaware of his rights will not assert a claim against an official who
violates them. Education about land-use rights is also important because of
the link between knowledge about rights and increases in farmers’
investment in their land,250 which in turn can potentially increase farmers’
production levels251 and incomes.252
Finally, more rights education for farmers could potentially add to
their use of the legal system to voice their grievances. While the Chinese
judiciary and the CCP are presumably not fond of an increase in litigation
against local officials, litigation might help to curb the tendencies of local
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officials to transfer land-use rights out of farmers’ hands for monetary
gain.253
In sum, the three changes in rural land-use rights have potential to
achieve the CCP and government’s goals for the Chinese countryside, but
will prove ineffective unless certain other measures accompany the changes.
To ensure that farmers can strongly represent their interests as collective
owners of rural agricultural land, Chinese law should clearly designate the
natural village/villagers’ group as the single entity that exercises ownership
rights to such land. In addition, the CCP and the Chinese government
should create a registration system for rural land that issues land contracts
and certificates to all farmers in order to increase farmers’ tenure security
and remove procedural obstacles to trading use rights on rural markets.
Lastly, the CCP and government should take steps to thoroughly educate
farmers about their land-use rights. Doing so will ensure that more farmers
assert their rights in the face of local officials who wish to ignore them, and
will likewise promote investment in land and trade in use rights on rural
markets.
V.

CONCLUSION

With the issuance of the 2008 Decision and the 2009 No. 1 Document,
the CCP and the Chinese government acknowledge that insecure land-use
rights are a major problem facing Chinese farmers and indeed the whole of
China today. Based on the documents themselves, it is apparent that the
CCP and the government are especially concerned about the growing ruralurban income gap as well as maintaining grain security amidst the drive to
convert agricultural land into construction land. These are problems that the
current legal structure governing rural land-use rights cannot adequately
address.
The Policy Documents propose remedies to these rural issues by
making already existing land-use rights more meaningful. According to the
documents, this goal will specifically involve: (1) granting farmers indefinite
terms for their contractual land-use rights; (2) creating markets for rural
land-use rights by removing the current limitation on assignment of
contractual terms; and (3) strongly restricting actions that decrease the total
amount of agricultural land nationwide, including disciplinary action against
local officials who fail to comply with the standards.
These specific measures are good steps toward enhancing the
meaningful land-use rights, and indirectly towards increasing farmers’
253
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incomes and maintaining grain security. Halting the conversion of cultivated
land to non-agricultural uses and granting farmers unlimited contractual
terms will increase farmers’ confidence in their ability to obtain returns on
investments in their land. Increased investments in agricultural land will in
turn boost production levels and help narrow the rural-urban income gap as
well as strengthen grain security. Facilitating a thriving market in land-use
rights will also give farmers an enhanced sense of control over the use of
their land. It will likewise boost production by making it easier for farmers
to form large-scale agricultural operations, thus contributing to increasing
farmers’ incomes and maintaining grain supply.
However, the Policy Documents leave several major problems
unaddressed, or do not address them in adequate detail. First, the
Documents signal no intention to specify a particular rural organization as
the holder of collective ownership, let alone an organization that could
democratically represent farmers in decisions about the collectively owned
land that they use. Second, unlimited contractual terms and the ability to
transfer land-use rights will prove useless without a fully functioning
registration system for use rights, in which issuance of contracts, compliance
of issued contracts with legal requirements, and recording of contracts are all
ensured and enforced. Lacking adequate documentation as well as a
centrally-protected record of their land-use rights, farmers will continue to
be unable to defend their interests in disputes over use rights or against local
officials who violate their rights, let alone transfer their rights on a market.
Finally, the CCP only mentions general measures to educate farmers about
the legal system. Unless the Chinese government commits to specifically
educating farmers about their land-use rights, many of them will continue to
be unable to defend their interests and confidently invest in their land, even
if an adequate registration system is in place.
In short, current Chinese policy regarding rural land-use rights does
not represent a “breakthrough” in rural reform. Farmers do not view
government efforts as having many real effects on them, and for good
reason; as it is currently structured, government policy adds little new
changes to existing law, and it does not contain all of the necessary measures
to strengthen land tenure security. Providing farmers with temporary
assurances and small reforms might pacify them into silence about their
grievances, but in the long run, farmers will only respond to stronger
measures that will truly empower them and improve their standard of living.
Furthermore, the benefits of such measures will probably not be limited to
Chinese farmers. Rather, by increasing farmers’ spending capacity and
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maintaining the grain supply, such measures will provide more stability to
China as a whole. In the words of the 2009 No. 1 Document,
Completion of work [for] agriculture and the countryside in
2009 has special and important meaning. The greatest potential
for expanding internal demand [exists] in the countryside; the
foundation for realizing stable and relatively speedy economic
development [lies] in agriculture; [and] farmers are both the key
and the obstacle to guaranteeing and improving the livelihoods
of the people.254
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